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ABSTRACT-In this article we compare the Canadian Heritage
Rivers System with the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and analyze case
law in order to identify the best means of ensuring preservation of Great
Plains rivers. We find that fear of federal dictates provides a powerful
political weapon for opponents of river preservation policies. Therefore,
we conclude that national officials should work with state, provincial,
and local officials to develop cooperative plans that enable local residents to participate in river management decisions. Cooperative river
management policies avoid the perception of federal government action
as threatening to state sovereignty, thereby removing a significant rhetorical and political obstacle to water preservation.

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Canadian Heritage Rivers System, environmental policy, river management, federalism

KEY WORDS:

Introduction
Nature and culture on the Great Plains are both significant and significantly understudied. Worster (1992: 105) wrote, "The ecological history of
the Great Plains is still to be accomplished, still to find its historians. When
they come to write it, they will have a subject of international significance,
for these days the dry lands of the earth are under pressure and scrutiny."
The ecology of the region serves as its common denominator. After all, the
diversity of a region that crosses a national boundary and numerous state
and provincial boundaries makes a unifying political culture unlikely. Rather
than straining to identify a thread of shared political culture, it makes sense
to focus on the common issues or problems within the region and the
particular laws and policies enacted to address them. One such common
issue is the management and preservation of water.
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Water and its scarcity are vital concerns in all the Plains states and
provinces. Thus, we need to understand the roles that governments play in
protecting this critical and natural resource. Despite common concern,
water policy varies across regimes of the North American Plains. Comparison across regimes may help us to identify better policies, better understand
the problem-solving mechanisms of the various governments, and better
appreciate the growing interdependence of political entities and institutions
(Heidenheimer et al. 1983). Our approach is to compare the policies developed to manage rivers on the Great Plains.
The provinces and states of the Great Plains have developed their own
river policies, but both the Canadian and US governments have developed
river management plans as well. However, federal or national guidance has
been greeted with suspicion and resistance by many Plains residents
(Miewald 1984; Carroll and Hendrix 1992; La Pierre 1994). Canada maintains' an unsteady balance between national unity and provincial identity
(Thorn burn 1985; Pinard 1992; Gaudreault-DesBiens 1999). In the United
States, antifederalists destroy federal buildings in protest of national governance (Apple 1995). Given the ambivalence and even hostility of Plains
residents to federal control, national government mandates concerning water resources tend to create resistance.
Despite such difficulties, national water management programs may
provide the greatest possibilities for preservation. The common water ethic
on the Plains appears to be take as much as you can get (Reisner 1993).
Links to environmental concerns in state or provincial policies have been
modest at best (Fairfax et al. 1984). However, environmental protection is
prioritized in the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (P.L. 90-542, 1968) and the
Canadian Heritage Rivers System (Canadian Heritage Rivers System Objectives. Principles. and Procedures 1984). Despite their different approaches, both programs seek to limit agricultural and industrial use of
water resources in order to preserve ecological, aesthetic, and recreational
uses of water.
Historically, water policies were the responsibility of state and provincial governments (Fairfax et al. 1984; Elgie 2001). Residents were slow to
recognized the ecological, aesthetic, or recreational values of water, perhaps because their initial concerns focused on survival-from drought,
blizzards, floods, grasshoppers, and other exigencies of the natural world
(Miewald and Longo 1993). As David Aiken (2002:56) has pointed out, in
the Great Plains, "water disputes typically focused on disputes among individual appropriators"-consumers rather than preservers of the existing
water supplies. In these disputes, the rule of priority has dominated (Aiken
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2002:54). Preservationist measures were initiated at the national level in
both Canada and the United States (Green 1999; Elgie 2001). Here we
compare the effectiveness of those measures.
Methods

We use a comparative case method, which is appropriate because our
interest is in explaining why antifederalist sentiment has been a greater
obstacle to designation of rivers under the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
than under the Canadian Heritage Rivers System (Yin 1989). Both countries
are federal systems in which water policy has historically rested with the
state or provincial governments. In both countries, the national government
has initiated river management efforts that emphasize preservation over the
"beneficial use" that characterized state and provincial policies (Reisner
1993). Yet public reactions to the two programs have differed. To explain
these reactions, we examine the programmatic language of both the US Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act and the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. We compare the methods of river protection enacted, evaluate reactions to these
measures within the affected states and provinces, consider the effects of
case law on river preservation in Great Plains states, and draw inferences
about the future of river preservation on the Plains from a comparison of
Canadian and US river preservation policies.
Results
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act

By crafting river policies that prioritize use, the Plains states left the
door open for federal intervention to protect habitat and aesthetic beauty of
Plains rivers. In 1968 Congress enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (P.L.
90-542, 1968). The act led to the development of a system of wild and scenic
rivers, each designated by an act of Congress and managed by the National
Park Service. By assigning management responsibility to the National Park
Service, Congress signaled its goal as preservation. As Sax (1980:709)
described them, national parks in the United States are "enclaves of preservation adrift in a sea of development." The act declared a different set of
values for river policy than had been the practice of the state governments:
The policy of the United States [is] that certain rivers of the nation,
which with their immediate environments possess outstandingly
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remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in freeflowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments
shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of future generations. (Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, P.L. 90-542, 1968)
The act gives Congress the authority to manage Plains rivers in a manner
contrary to the "beneficial use" principle that typified state management
(Reisner 1993). The shift in values for water policy was complicated by
residents' suspicion of federal dictates. Local practice and preferences did
not match congressional intentions, and the populist character of Plains
residents led them to favor local control and resent federal intrusion (Foster
1991). Clashes between local residents and federal policymakers were the
foreseeable result.
In North Dakota, a coalition of environmental organizations developed a plan to achieve federal wilderness designation for approximately
200,000 acres of grasslands in the Badlands region and wild and scenic river
designations for sections of the Little Missouri and Pembina Rivers (Agricultural Law/Economic Research Program 1994). The proposal came under
fire from local economic interests. Opposition to federal intervention united
ranchers and oil producers with local citizens leery of outside influence in
general and the federal government in particular (La Pierre 1994). The
environmentalists who drafted the plan were characterized as outsiders
threatening the livelihoods of local residents.
In Texas, plans to designate a stretch of the Rio Grande downstream
from Big Bend National Park as wild and scenic met with hostility from
local residents. In public meetings, National Park Service personnel were
met by irate citizens, who objected to a perceived "dictatorial tone" from the
federal agency (Carroll and Hendrix 1992:350). Opposition to the project
essentially derailed it as the National Park Service curtailed operational
funding and transferred staff.
In Minnesota, plans by the Department of Transportation to build a
four-lane bridge over the St. Croix River were stopped by a National Park
Service ruling. The National Park Service concluded the bridge "would
have a direct and adverse effect on the scenic and recreational values of the
Lower St. Croix National Scenic Riverway" (Heinrich 1997:18). The Minnesota Department of Transportation challenged the National Park Service's
legal authority to block the bridge plan, arguing that regional transportation
needs should take priority over the river's scenic value and its provision of
habitat. The Minnesota Department of Transportation's motion for sum-
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mary judgment to vacate the National Park Service ruling was denied (Sierra Club North Star Chapter v. Pena, 1 F. Supp. 2d 971, 1998).
Such problems can be understood as a consequence of the perception
among Plains residents that the federal government's river management
plans usurped authority over what should be a local matter.
Canadian Heritage Rivers System
In Canada, the national government's river policy is less intrusive than
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The Heritage Rivers System, established in
1984, allows provinces to enroll rivers voluntarily, rather than through
action by a national legislature. Despite the lack of coercion at the national
level, the program is not void of conflict. As Thornburn (1985:115) noted,
"Canadians are accustomed to hearing complaints about the cost of federalism and the inefficiency caused by duplication in and the differences between the two levels of government." Nonetheless, cooperation between
central and provincial governments is a necessity of the Canadian union.
This large and diverse federal state has often wrestled with questions of
national identity and provincial autonomy (Pinard 1992; GaudreaultDesBiens 1999). Given these dynamics, the Canadian government needs to
be particularly cautious about actions that might be perceived as imperialistic or that might lend political support to provincial independence movements.
Rather than imposing a river management policy on the regional governments, the Canadian Heritage Rivers System approaches river management in a spirit of cooperation between the two levels of government. The
language used in Canadian Heritage Rivers System Objectives, Principles,
and Procedures (1984) emphasized the joint effort to preserve Canada's
rivers:
The System will be a co-operative one in which federal, provincial,
and territorial governments, in participating in the establishment
and administration of the System, retain their traditional jurisdictional powers, including ownership of the land, the choice to nominate a river to the System, and the right to continue to operate and
manage designated rivers in accordance with the objectives of the
System.
By allowing local governments to initiate designation of a heritage river and
to continue to manage the river in cooperation with the federal government,
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under program guidelines, the Canadian plan allows for greater local control and eases jurisdictional conflicts.
Although Canada's process for designating and managing rivers is
quite different from the US approach, the Heritage Rivers System and the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act share a common purpose in establishing preservationist values for river policy. Although participation is voluntary, the
Canadian Heritage Rivers System is a highly proactive environmental policy.
Preservation of river ecosystems is the goal of the Heritage Rivers System
guidelines.
A couple of examples illustrate that cooperative management of heritage rivers has been successful. The Grand River in Ontario was designated
a heritage river in 1994. "Grand Strategy," the watershed management plan
developed for the Grand River, included community as well as technical
working groups and required approval from the residents of over 60 communities. In 2000, the Grand River Conservation Authority was awarded the
Thiess Services Riverprize, an international award for excellence in river
management (Canadian Heritage Rivers Board 200 I: 18-20).
The Canadian Heritage Rivers System charter (Parks Canada 1997)
explicitly recognizes indigenous peoples as stakeholders in the nomination,
designation, and management of heritage rivers. The Thelon River, designated a heritage river in 1990, and the Thelon Wildlife Sanctuary, established in 1927, are important sites for both the Inuit and Dene peoples.
Because the Thelon River and Wildlife Sanctuary straddle the border between the Northwest Territories and the Nunavut Territory, approval from
both territorial governments as well as their respective communities is
required in order for a management plan to be adopted. This requirement
provides considerable influence to the Inuit and Dene in determining how
the Thelon River will be used and protected. As David Pelly (2001) wrote,
"Natives and non-Natives alike, having converged from different responsibilities, different histories, different quests, now share the responsibility for
the care of the northern wilderness. There is a certain irony (a certain
correctness, even) ... in the fact that it is the Native peoples who now hold
the balance of power in the management of this wilderness." Cooperation
between governments that maintain their traditional jurisdictional powers is
a hallmark of the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. As a result, designation
and management of heritage rivers cannot be labeled "Ottawa's usurpation
of provincial authority" by opponents of preservation.
This is not to say that Canadian river management is devoid of political
controversy or that preservation inevitably results. For example, in Friends
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of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (88 D.L.R. [4th] 1 [S.c.c.]), economic factors outweighed the concerns of Native communities and environmental groups. The province of Alberta planned to build a dam on the
Oldman River and had gotten approval under the Navigable Waters Protection Act. An environmental group sued to compel the federal Departments
of Transport and Fisheries and Oceans to conduct environmental assessments. Federal versus provincial responsibilities were at issue in the case.
The court held that the impact of the dam on navigation was a federal matter,
requiring approval from the minister of transport, but the environmental
impact of the dam was a provincial matter that did not mandate invol vement
by the minister of fisheries and oceans. Absence of clear authority in the
shared management of public works projects "allowed Ottawa to classify
provincial megaprojects as provincial responsibilities, thereby avoiding
confrontations with provinces that did not welcome its interest in their
affairs" (Taylor 1990:29).
An additional attribute of the Canadian system deserves mention as
well. Just as it may initiate designation of a heritage river, a province may
also initiate an action to "de-designate" a river from heritage classification.
As Noel and Gimble (1993:13) observed, "A Wild and Scenic river, once so
designated and regardless of its classification, may never be dammed or
otherwise degraded, and there is no de-designation process. A Canadian
Heritage river may be 'de-designated' at the nominating province's request,
or if its values have been significantly degraded." The option of de-designation may make the Canadian program less appealing to environmentalists
than the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Under the Heritage Rivers System,
designated rivers may be subject to continuous efforts to de-designate, in
order to allow for new development and use.

Court Cases from the Plains States
Federal legislative action is seldom the end of the story. Conflicts over
river policy resolved in the courts provide additional insights into the
relative merits of state or federal river management plans in achieving
preservation.
Oklahoma has had two noteworthy river cases, Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma (426 U.S. 776, 1976)
and Arkansas v. Oklahoma (503 U.S. 91, 1992). In both cases, Oklahoma's
decision to provide state protection for a scenic river rather than seeking
federal designation under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act resulted in a
judicial determination contrary to the preservation interests of the state.
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In the Flint Ridge case, a local environmental group challenged a plan
by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development to construct
homes along the Illinois River (426 U.S. 782). The group argued that the
development would interfere with protection of the river consistent with its
status as a state-designated scenic river. The group sought an injunction
until the secretary of housing and urban development completed an environmental impact study. The secretary claimed that such a study would
present a conflict of interest between the agency's mandate for development
and the likelihood that the environmental impact statement would prevent
development, and the court agreed (426 U.S. 788). The court determined
that the secretary of housing and urban development cannot risk sacrificing
development for the sake of environmental concerns. Statutory language,
combined with the state's failure to have the river designated under the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act, prevented Oklahoma from protecting its most precious river, even though the state itself considered the Illinois River worthy
of preservation.
Despite its eligibility, the Illinois River was not designated a wild and
scenic river by the US Congress, and local news reports indicated that
federal designation would be unwelcome. The Tulsa World (1994) reported
that area landowners required reassurance that federal takeover of the waterway was merely a rumor. Although local residents' reluctance to accept
federal involvement in the management of the Illinois River is understandable, the outcome of the Flint Ridge case demonstrated that this reluctance
has its downside. Oklahoma's river policies alone proved inadequate to
protect the Illinois River from development.
Similar conclusions flow from the outcome of the Arkansas v. Oklahoma case (503 U.S. 91, 1992). Many Illinois River tributaries flow into
Oklahoma from Arkansas. The water coming from Arkansas carried waste
exceeding the standards permitted by Oklahoma. Arkansas was unwilling to
improve water quality to meet those standards, so the dispute moved to
federal court. The court ruled that Oklahoma could not enact stricter environmental safeguards than the Environmental Protection Agency and expect another state to comply with the more stringent provisions. As long as
Arkansas had permission from the Environmental Protection Agency to
dump waste into the Illinois River, state environmental laws would be
insufficient to prevent that waste from flowing downstream into Oklahoma.
This ruling probably would not have occurred if the Illinois River had been
designated as a wild and scenic river. Such a designation would have meant
a higher standard for water quality in order to prevent degradation of the
river and its immediate environment.
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Even when a Plains state is trying to conserve a natural resource and
protect its citizenry from environmental harm, there is no guarantee that
state policies will be sufficient to the task in a federal system where state
conflicts over shared resources are common. It is clear from the court's
ruling that water usage, regardless of ill effects, is encouraged rather than
discouraged unless statutory provision for other values is in place. Oklahoma law cannot provide for preservation in a manner binding on Arkansas;
only federal law can.
A case involving a dispute over groundwater provides further evidence that water usage is given priority over water preservation, unless
statutory provision for preservation is in place. In Sporhase v. Nebraska
(458 U.S. 941, 1982), a farmer with holdings in both Nebraska and Colorado used water from a Nebraska well to irrigate her land in both states. The
Nebraska supreme court ruled that use of Nebraska groundwater to irrigate
Colorado land was violation of Nebraska law (Douglas v. Sporhase, 208
Neb. 703, 1981). The US Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska ruling,
concluding that the role of water in agribusiness prohibited restriction on its
transportation across state boundaries under the commerce clause of the US
Constitution (Longo 1990). The Nebraska supreme court's ruling, although
based in part on protectionism, urged conservation of water for future
generations. By reversing this ruling, the US Supreme Court elevated commercial use over conservation, arguing that the state's conservation interests were subordinated to commercial use under the commerce clause.
Given such interpretation, federal statutes that mandate preservation stand
a better chance 'of success than state efforts. Federal action, however, meets
with suspicion and hostility from Plains residents. A solution to this quandary is needed.
The Case of the Niobrara River
The infamous Sporhase case serves as a reminder that federalism as
determined by the US Supreme Court often contravenes the wishes of the
local body politic. As Miewald (1984: 184) noted, "One often gets the
impression that a government larger than a single farmer and a couple of
neighbors is a tyranny worse than anything contemplated by King George
III. And in a state with fewer people than some American cities and counties,
the capital city is often regarded as the home of some alien power." An
illustration of this perspective on federalism occurred in the designation of
Nebraska's Niobrara River as a wild and scenic river.
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Some Nebraskans wanted to dam the Niobrara River, while others
sought to enjoin the dam construction. The debate between these two sides
was predictable, as was its eventual movement to the judicial arena. In Save
the Niobrara Association v. Andrus (483 F. Supp. 844, 1977), the Court
ruled that the Bureau of Land Reclamation failed to address questions about
geologic stability, groundwater quality, and effects of the proposed dam on
wildlife in its requisite environmental impact statement. As a result, construction of the dam was halted, and debate over the future of the Niobrara
River shifted to other policy loci.
The Niobrara River was designated a national wild and scenic river on
24 May 1991 (P.L. 102-50). An Omaha World-Herald (1989) public opinion
poll, published just after three members of Nebraska's congressional delegation introduced the legislation, indicated that 74% of Nebraskans favored the designation, 15% opposed it, and II % had no opinion. However,
the same poll showed that, within the four counties affected by the new
designation (Rock, Brown, Cherry, and Keya Paha), the opposite view
prevailed. Fifty-six percent of the residents opposed the designation and
only 28% favored it. Sixty-eight percent of the ranchers in the four-county
area opposed the designation and only 18% favored it. Opposition to the
designation increased in direct proportion to the respondents' physical proximity to the Niobrara River and to the personal impact the designation
would have on those who envisioned other uses for the river.
Fear of federal dictates lay at the heart of the opposition. The law that
incorporated the Niobrara into the Wild and Scenic Rivers System specified
that a 40-mile segment of the river and cont1uence were to be administered
by the secretary of the interior (P.L. 102-50, 1991). The law seems to
transfer control over that section of the river to the federal government from
the Nebraskans who had controlled it for over a century. This shift in control
did not sit well with locals, and press coverage continued to reference poll
results that showed the designation was opposed by a majority of residents
in the four-county area (Hendee 1991).
A closer examination of the act shows opportunities for local input
regarding management of the Niobrara River. Section 5 of the act established an advisory commission that "shall advise the Secretary of the Interior ... on matters pertaining to the development of a management plan"
(P.L. 102-50), 1991). Membership on the committee was designed to ensure
that the views of local residents, particularly those with a special interest in
the management of the Niobrara River, would be represented. It provided
for six members who own farm or ranch property in the designated river
corridor, one member who is a canoe outfitter, one member to be chosen by
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the governor, two members from county governments or natural resource
districts, and one member from a conservation organization.
Although the secretary of the interior was given final statutory authority over the designated Niobrara River corridor, active political participation by the interests represented on the advisory commission could lead to
river management palatable to local residents. Representatives of ranchers,
the governor, and local government provide pragmatic access points for the
disaffected. The process was designed to allow participation by those outside the federal bureaucracy.
It may be tempting for critics of federalism to dismiss local participation on the advisory commission as illusory and to claim that designation as
a wild and scenic river has dictated the course of the Niobrara's future.
Some local residents expressed such sentiments. For example, the Omaha
World-Herald reported that local rancher Hugh Potter remarked, "I really
believe, regardless of how many meetings we go to, how many proposals
that the advisory committee discusses, the public in general will have
nothing to say in the decision-making" (Thomas 1994). Despite reasonable
concerns over loss of local control of river management, Nebraskans should
not conclude that management by the Department of Interior is a guaranteed
victory for preservationist values. As Shepard (1984:479) noted, "In recent
years ... the activities of private industries and individuals have threatened
to prevent many national parks and other specially protected federal reserves from fulfilling their declared purposes." Most activity in and around
the Niobrara will proceed as it has for decades, and some of this activity will
be almost certainly be disruptive to the purposes of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act.
Legal and political efforts to define the parameters for use of the
Niobrara River are ongoing. A local environmental group, Friends of the
Niobrara, is planning to raise money to buy easements along the Niobrara
because the group believes that the National Park Service has not done
enough to limit development in the scenic corridor (Laukaitis 2000). Designation also does not proscribe additional litigation. Sokol v. Kennedy (210
F. 3d 876, 2000) illustrated that statutory language provides an additional
access point for disaffected land users. Sokol, a rancher in Cherry County,
sued the National Park Service over its selection of boundaries for the
Niobrara scenic river corridor under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Sokol
disputed the meaning of the phrase "outstandingly remarkable" as it applied
to land adjacent to the river. He argued that the National Park Service failed
to give sufficient consideration to the proposal favored by landowners and
local governments: to establish the boundaries at the high water mark on the
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riverbank and exclude any land above the bank (210 F. 3d 876). The appeals
court sided with Sokol, ruling that the Park Service "selected land for
inclusion in the Niobrara Scenic River area without identifying and seeking
to protect outstandingly remarkable values, as required by the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act" (210 F. 3d 878).
Statutory language provides legal grounds to dispute how much land
must be protected to preserve the "outstandingly remarkable values" that
led to a river's designation and to dispute which activities threaten those
values. Although not as cooperative in design as the Canadian Heritage
Rivers System, the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides local interests,
even those opposed to the designation, a voice in river management. As the
Niobrara River case illustrates, conflicts over how to manage the river to
achieve statutory goals endure far beyond the designation process.
Discussion: The Comparative Lessons
The battle over river protection on the Great Plains has pitted environmentalist against landowner. Landowners have made federalism an underlying concern in this dispute, and they have gotten considerable mileage
from opposing designation on the principles of local control and resistence
against federal usurpation, rather than framing their opposition in terms of
self-interest in preserving the status quo. Although federal-state relations are
obviously important, they also serve a convenient political function of galvanizing opposition to wild and scenic river designation for Plains rivers.
The Canadian Heritage Rivers System provides a means of diffusing
political opposition to river protection that is grounded in resentment against
intrusion from a distant capital. Some Plains residents would undoubtedly
oppose preservationist policy regardless of its source. But tensions between
state and federal power complicate the debate over appropriate river management plans and provide political capital to organizations and individuals
opposed to preservation per se. Because it emphasizes local initiation and
management, the Canadian alternative avoids the perception of an avaricious federal government intent on wrestling control over property and
natural resources from local residents. Although the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act (P.L. 29-542, 1968: section 13) includes concern for local authority and
expressly limits federal right to water "to only the quantity necessary to
accomplish statutory purposes," the perception of federal government action as threatening to state sovereignty persists. This perception creates
incentives for local political officials to resist designation, and it makes
consensus around shared policy goals more difficult to achieve.
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The tensions over federal-state jurisdictions in river management are
greater in the US than in the Canadian approach. Plouffe (1986:848) argued
that public attitudes toward preservation have changed dramatically. He
concluded: "Congress should give states with interest and ability to initiate
river resource planning a meaningful role in federal decisions that determine the use of rivers within their borders." The heritage river model allows
local communities to initiate and activate meaningful river policies in partnership with provincial and national governments. But the furor over federal-state relationships in the United States makes similar cooperative efforts
more difficult. We conclude that the prospects for preservationist water
policy are improved under the Canadian system.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides an alternative designation
mechanism with benefits similar to the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. A
rarely applied provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (section 2[a] [ii])
allows a river to be designated under the act by request from a state's
governor. To be designated under section 2(a)(ii), a river must be protected
under a state's river protection program by an act of the state's legislature.
The river must also be eligible for federal designation as determined by the
secretary of the interior. Finally, most costs of administration of the river
under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act are borne by the state (Hannon and
Cassidy 1999: 146).
In a detailed study of section 2(a)(ii), Hannon and Cassidy (1999: 148)
argued that this provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act has been used
in several cases where there was a "desire within the state to prevent federal
control of the river." For example, the first river designated under section
2(a)(ii) was a section of the Allagash Wilderness Waterway in northern
Maine, which the US Bureau of Outdoor Recreation had recommended
become a national riverway managed by the US Department of the Interior,
a move that the state of Maine opposed. Five years later, when the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act passed, the governor of Maine requested designation
under section 2(a)(ii) (Hannon and Cassidy 1999). This option made it
possible for the state to maintain its control over the river while acquiring
the increased protection that federal designation provided.
As we observed in the case of the Niobrara River, a trend toward
greater local control over river management is underway even where rivers
were designated through congressional action. The benefits of section 2(a)(ii)
are that the state government initiates designation and that the state maintains a greater degree of responsibility to manage the river under the guidelines of the act. These options, if better known, might help to shape the
public perceptions of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act as a cooperative rather
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than interventionist water policy. As a result, more rivers may receive
federal designation, with the attendant benefits of "increased recognition, a
probable increase in pri vate land values, and increased recreational usage,
with corresponding economic benefits to the state or states involved"
(Hannon and Cassidy 1999: 149). According to Hannon and Cassidy (1999),
by 1998, the 30th anniversary of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, only 16%
of the total river miles designated under the act had been included in the
system through section 2(a)(ii).
Fear of federal intervention has been a consistent obstacle to greater
use of and public support for national river protection policies like the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act. Greater cooperation between federal officials and
local residents is needed to provide for the future of the great rivers of the
Great Plains. Both the Canadian Heritage Rivers System and section 2(a)(ii)
of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provide mechanisms for preservationist
policy grounded on the principle of cooperation. Public support for preservationist values is increasing. This support must not be siphoned off through
federal action perceived as "dictatorial" or "interventionist," even if those
perceptions are in error. Preservation-minded policy makers should not
provide rhetorical ammunition to their adversaries when cooperative means
of achieving their goals are available.
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